We study how advice affects the development of strategic play in a signaling game. Being paired with an advisor who plays strategically significantly increases strategic play by advisees, but far from guarantees that advisees will act strategically. In spite of substantial financial incentives, many advisors who play strategically do not provide advice to this effect. This is especially common for female advisors. We hypothesize that this gender difference reflects lower confidence by women, a conjecture consistent with several other features of the data. Also contributing to weak performance by advisees are frequent failures to heed advice to play strategically.
Introduction:
In making decisions, we often rely on advice from others. Many times the people giving advice have no qualifications beyond our own. A colleague, with no more training or experience than I have, gives me advice on how to design an experiment. A friend, who has no more financial expertise than I do, gives me advice on what mutual fund to choose for my retirement account. A CEO relies on his second-in-command for advice on business strategy, even though this individual has similar training and eventually plans to become a CEO himself.
Even when advisors have no special training or expertise, advice can still be useful. This is particularly obvious in the case of "eureka problems": difficult problems that have an easily explained correct solution. My chances of solving a problem of this sort improve substantially if I can draw on advice from somebody else, since even if I don't solve the problem, my advisor may figure it out and then tell me the solution.
As the preceding sentence suggests, successful advice is a multi-stage process. Not only must my advisor know the solution to the problem when I don't, but he must also choose to communicate the solution to me and I must heed the advice. If any of these stages break down, advice will fail to have a positive impact. The purpose of our paper is to experimentally examine how advice affects the ability of individuals to learn to play strategically in a game theoretic setting. Our results show that having an advisor significantly increases the frequency of strategic play, especially when the advisor plays strategically. But the effect is weaker than would be predicted by a truth wins model where advisees play strategically if either they or their advisor figure out strategic play. Detailed analysis of the data allows us to identify systematic break downs in the advice process as a number of advisors who play strategically fail to give advice to this effect and even when provided with sound advice, a number of advisees systematically ignore it. This analysis also reveals two additional features of the advice process:
(1) How advice is given and received differs strongly between men and women and (2) The marginal value of a sound explanation as to why the advice should be followed, on top of having the sound strategic option pointed out, is essentially zero.
Going into the details, we study advice in the context of a signaling game based on Milgrom and Roberts' (1982) entry limit pricing game. Strategic play in the limit pricing game is rare initially, but develops with experience. In games with a pure strategy separating equilibrium, like the limit pricing game, strategic play involves high quality type senders recognizing how they can make their type clear to receivers via separating. Taken together, these features imply that learning to play strategically can naturally be described as a "eureka" type problem -strategic play is not obvious, but derives from an insight that can easily be explained to others.
The main treatment in our paper randomly assigns subjects to fixed pairs of advisors and advisees. Advisors have no greater qualification to play the limit pricing game than their advisees, having the same amount of experience and the same information. The advisors can send advice to their advisees on a continuous basis while both play a series of limit pricing games, and they receive a bonus payment based on their advisees' payoffs as an incentive to provide useful advice. Subjects play an initial session as "inexperienced" subjects, and then return about a week later for a second session as "experienced" subjects.
We compare the development of strategic play in the advice treatment with sessions where subjects play as individuals (1x1 treatment), neither giving nor receiving advice, and sessions where subjects play in two subject teams (2x2 treatment). Teammates in the 2x2 treatment make a single joint decision and can communicate with each other continuously through an instant messaging system. Both advisors and advisees have higher levels of strategic play than subjects in the 1x1 treatment throughout the inexperienced subject sessions and the initial periods of experienced subject play. At this point the difference tapers off with individual subjects (1x1 treatment) catching up to both advisors and advisees. Advisees, who have the benefits of advice as well as their own insights, have consistently higher levels of strategic play than advisors. However, they have consistently lower levels of strategic play than observed in the 2x2 treatment.
We use a modified version of the truth wins (TW) norm (Lorge and Solomon, 1955) as a benchmark for how well advice is functioning. The TW norm was initially developed as a measure of performance for freely interacting teams solving eureka problems. For problems with clearly demonstrable solutions, a team should solve the problem if any of its members solve the problem since this person can pass on the solution to the rest of the team. Applying the TW norm to the advice treatment, we model advisees as playing strategically if either they figure out strategic play on their own or are paired with an advisor who plays strategically. Unlike the teams, advisees never meet the TW norm and generally fall significantly below this level.
Implicitly, the TW norm assumes that an advisor who plays strategically always advises his partner to do so, and that advisees always follow advice to play strategically. In our data failures occur in both steps of the advice process. For inexperienced sessions, almost half (43%) of advisors who have a history of playing strategically fail to advise their partners to play strategically. This cannot be attributed to a general unwillingness to send messages or give advice, as 93% of inexperienced advisors send at least some messages and 85% send messages that include advice about how to play. Nor can it be attributed to inexperienced subjects who have just considered playing strategically for the first time: 41% of inexperienced advisors who first play strategically during the first half of their session never advise their partners to play strategically. The quality of advice is little improved in experienced subject sessions. Even though almost all advisors (86%) play strategically in the first half of the session, 42% never advise their partner to do so. Turning to advisees, a third (34%) of inexperienced advisees who have received advice to play strategically fail to follow it. This number drops in experienced subject sessions, but more because almost all advisees are playing strategically regardless of advice than any increase in receptiveness to advice. The truth wins model assumes that advice acts like a well-made pipe, conveying an advisor's insights to the advisee without any loss, but our data indicates that this pipe is actually quite leaky.
This raises a natural question of what factors are responsible for this process loss? A key factor for advisors is that women are significantly less likely to advise strategic play than men, even after controlling for differing frequencies of strategic play. The difference is especially striking if we consider the case where advice is most critical, among inexperienced advisors who have played strategically. Seventy three percent (73%) of inexperienced male advisors who have played strategically also give advice to play strategically, compared to only 31% of female advisors. Oddly, women who have not played strategically are significantly more likely to provide strategic advice than men, although the level of such advice remains much lower than for those advisors who have played strategically. Both of these factors suggest that women have less confidence in their insights than men, a result that has received support in other settings (see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007 , for example).
For advisees, gender differences play a smaller role. Women are more receptive to advice than men, but this difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Instead, the breakdown of the TW norm for advisees is driven by the many advisees of both genders who ignore good advice. This type of under-response to advice is referred to as "egocentric advice discounting" in the psychology literature. The relevant psychology literature deals with non-strategic environments. A typical study might ask subjects about the dates of various historical events and then provide subjects information about other individuals' answers (or other subjects' advice about the answer). Subjects systematically underweight this information when revising their initial answer. Not only do we extend this result to a new setting, strategic games, but also examine a case where demonstrably correct advice can be given. A notable feature of our data is that receiving an explanation has virtually no effect on the likelihood that advisees will follow advice to play strategically. The unwillingness of individuals to heed good advice is especially striking when the task in question is a eureka type problem and advisees are given the underlying logic needed to understand the problem.
Having observed relatively strong gender effects with respect to giving and receiving advice, we naturally looked to see if gender differences were present in the development of strategic play across all three of our basic treatments: 1x1 games, advisors taken as a whole and advisees taken as whole. In all three cases we observe less strategic play by women than men.
Given that cognitive ability is basically identical for men and women in our sample, we conjecture that relatively low adoption of strategic play by women reflects lower confidence in their insights. The paper contributes to several different literatures. First, with respect to the gender literature this is the first paper that identifies differences between men and women in the advice literature other than the tendency for women to offer greater "social support," where social support is defined as emotional support in dealing with difficult decisions.
1 The result that women who act strategically are less likely to provide advice to this effect than men, ties into experimental results showing that women are less confident in economic environments (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) , and helps to explain why a significant percentage of incentivized advisors who play strategically fail to provide advice to this effect. Second, as already noted our results extend and strengthen the psychology literature on "egocentric advice discounting."
Our results also help to clarify why freely interacting two person teams play at or above the TW norm in these signaling games, a result previously reported in Cooper and Kagel (2005) and replicated here. First, the simple act of thinking harder about the game and writing these thoughts out has no impact compared to individuals simply playing the game (the self-advice treatment discussed below). Second, simply having access to "two heads" is not, by itself, sufficient for meeting or beating the TW norm since advisees systematically underperform relative to two-person teams. Instead, full bilateral communication appears to be necessary, even with its high frequency of irrelevant chatter and potential for free riding, a fact that has previously not been recognized in the literature. We conjecture that the "leaky pipe" syndrome that limits the effectiveness of advice is less of a problem with bilateral communication.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section I introduces the limit pricing game. Sections II and III summarize the experimental design and procedures. Section IV specifies the main research hypotheses. Section V reports the experimental results both in terms of subjects' behavior in the limit pricing game as well as comparing the content of the dialogues between advisors and advisees and teams. Section VI summarizes the main results and their potential broader implications.
I. The Limit Pricing Game:
The experiment employs a stylized version of Milgrom and Roberts' (1982) entry limit pricing game that focuses on the signaling aspects of the game (see Tables 1a and 1b ). An incumbent monopolist (M) faces a potential entrant (E). The game proceeds as follows: (1) The asymmetric information, in conjunction with the fact that it is profitable to enter against MHs but not against MLs, provides an incentive for strategic play (limit pricing). The game has two pure strategy separating (sequential) equilibria. In both equilibria MHs play 2 with certainty. MLs play 6 in the efficient equilibrium and 7 in the inefficient equilibrium. In both equilibria Es enter against all outputs that are less than MLs' equilibrium choice. This is supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs that any output less than 6 in the efficient equilibrium, or less than 7 in the inefficient equilibrium, represents an MH with sufficiently high probability to induce entry. Past research shows that play typically converges, albeit slowly, to the efficient separating equilibrium (Cooper and Kagel, 2005 
II. Experimental Design:
For all treatments subjects play the limit pricing game for one inexperienced subject session (24 periods) and one experienced subject session (32 periods).
Inexperienced subjects have not previously played any version of the limit pricing game.
Experienced subjects have played in an inexperienced subject session of the same treatment.
Throughout the paper the term "player" refers to an agent in the limit pricing game, regardless of whether this agent was an individual subject or a pair of subjects playing as a team.
The treatments vary who the players are (individuals or teams) and the communication and decision protocol employed.
In the 1x1 treatment, the players are individuals acting in isolation. They receive feedback about the past history of play, as described below but have no direct input from other subjects.
In the 2x2 treatment players are freely interacting two subject teams. Teams are randomly formed at the beginning of a session and remain fixed throughout the session. Teammates must jointly agree on a choice, having (almost) continuous access to a messaging program that allows for bilateral communication about possible actions. Both teammates receive the full payout from their team's outcomes.
In the self-advice treatment, play was identical to the 1x1 treatment except for one change:
While making choices, subjects were given a text box and prompted to enter "self-advice", period by period, as play evolved. Specifically, the instructions told subjects, "... we have reason to believe that writing out your thoughts regarding what's going on helps in making good choices." Subjects were given continuous access to their self-advice from past plays of the game throughout the session.
Subjects in the advice treatment were randomly assigned to two subject teams, with one teammate randomly chosen to be the "advisor" and the other becoming the "advisee." Team pairings and roles within a team were fixed for the session. Advisors and advisees played the limit pricing game separately, with no need to agree on a common action (and no mechanism for doing so). Advisors had (almost) continuous access to a messaging program which they could use to send advice to their advisee. The instructions explicitly describe the messages as "advice." Advisees could not communicate with their advisors and were under no obligation to pay attention to the advice provided. Advisors had no way to identify the actions of their advisee, limiting the possibility of non-verbal feedback from advisees. Thus, communication in the advice treatment was strictly unilateral.
To give advisors an incentive to provide useful advice, they received a "bonus" equal to 30%
of their advisee's total payoff (along with their own payoff). These bonus payments were only reported at the end of an experimental session so that advisors could not tell what choices their advisees had made. Advisees received their full payoff and had no direct stake in the advisor's outcome.
In any given play of the game an advisor and his advisee played the same role (an M or an E), and were the same type (MH or ML) as Ms. This was common knowledge, with the instructions stressing that an advisor would never play against his advisee. Es were randomly paired with different Ms, with a rotation rule that insured they would not be matched with the same M more than once in each cycle of play.
[Insert Table 2 here] Table 2 summarizes the number of sessions and number of subjects employed in each of the four treatments, broken down by experience.
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III. Experimental Procedures: Inexperienced (experienced) subject sessions used a round robin format where each M met a different E for six (four) plays of the game. Es and Ms then switched roles and played for another set of six (four) games. We refer to the complete set of twelve (eight) rounds as a "cycle." This process repeated itself for a total of 24 (32) games -two cycles in an inexperienced subject session and four in an experienced subject session. The one exception to this rule was experienced subject sessions in the 2x2 treatment. The 2x2 sessions took the longest to run, with play swiftly converging to the efficient separating equilibrium in experienced subject sessions. To avoid keeping subjects for an unusually long amount of time, only three cycles were run instead of four. Given the strong convergence to the efficient separating equilibrium in the second and third cycle, there is no reason to believe that any further changes in behavior would have occurred during a fourth cycle.
At the beginning of inexperienced subject sessions a common set of instructions were read out loud, with each subject having a written copy. 7 Subjects had copies of both Ms' and Es' payoff tables and were required to fill out a short questionnaire insuring their ability to read them. After reading the instructions, questions were answered out loud and play began with a single practice round followed by a short recapitulation of the instructions as well as another opportunity for questions. At the beginning of experienced subject sessions an abbreviated version of the instructions were read out loud with each subject having a written copy. All instructions were framed in abstract terminology. For example, Ms were referred to as A players, with MHs and MLs described as A1s and A2s. Likewise, Es were called B players and
choose between x and y rather than IN and OUT. We use meaningful labels throughout the paper to ease the exposition. Following each play of the game subjects learned their own payoff, the payoff for the player they were paired with, and M's type. In addition, the lower left-hand portion of each player's screen displayed the results of all pairings: M's type, M's output, and E's response ordered by output levels from highest to lowest. The screen automatically displayed the three most recent periods of play, with a scroll bar available to see all past periods. 1x1 and self-advice sessions employed between 10 -16 subjects while 2x2 sessions used 16 -24 subjects resulting in between 8 -16 players in any given experimental session. 9 The number of subjects in the advice sessions varied widely, ranging from a minimum of 12 to a maximum of 28. This variation was intentional. We initially employed relatively large sessions with 20 or more subjects, but this raised a potential confound for comparison with the other treatments as subjects receive feedback from the entire population of players, resulting in up to twice as much feedback regarding population play as the other treatments. To control for this, we replicated all of the advice sessions using a maximum of 16 subjects. This difference in the number of players had virtually no effect on the results reported and will generally not be dealt with except as a control variable in the regressions reported in the Appendix to the paper.
Subjects were recruited through e-mail announcements directed primarily to introductory economics classes at Ohio State University. Most sessions employed a "double header" design requiring subjects to commit to both an inexperienced and experienced subject session at the same time with the show-up fee ($20), along with half of session one's earnings, withheld until a subject had completed the second session. As part of the process subjects had to agree to come back to one of two scheduled experienced subject sessions, with the inexperienced and experienced sessions conducted within a two week period of each other. This recruiting procedure induced most subjects (87%) to return for an experienced subject session. 10 There are no statistically significant differences in the likelihood of strategic play by subjects who did not return and those who did. Since subjects could choose between two experienced subject sessions, these sessions contained a mix of subjects from different inexperienced sessions. By the same token, it was not possible to keep teams or roles fixed across sessions.
Inexperienced (experienced) subject sessions lasted a little under two (one and a half) hours.
All payments were in cash, with the experimental currency ("francs") converted to dollars at a 400:1 ration. Earnings averaged slightly less than $69 for a subject who completed both sessions, including the $20 show-up fee. 9 The somewhat smaller team sessions result from the fact that twice as many subjects are needed per player in the 2x2 treatment in conjunction with limited lab space and variation in show-up rates, particularly for experienced subject sessions due to the failure of some subjects to return. 10 As a methodological check, we ran half of the 1x1 sessions using standard recruiting methods with no special inducement to return. Not surprisingly, the percentage of subjects returning was substantially lower (65%) than in the "double headers" (95% in the 1x1 treatment, 87% overall). The data shows that the recruiting method did not systematically affect the likelihood of MLs playing strategically.
IV. Initial Hypotheses:
The results section focuses on comparing levels of strategic play of MLs as advisors and advisees, as well as comparing MLs' strategic play in the advice treatment with the 1x1 and 2x2 sessions. This section formulates initial hypotheses about these treatment effects by extending the TW model to the advisor-advisee sessions. Let p(T) be the probability that an individual in treatment T {1x1, 2x2, self-advice, advisor, advisee} plays strategically as an ML independent from being told the solution by another subject. The probability of an individual with access to input from a group of size N playing strategically in treatment T is 1 - gives the probability that an individual who has successfully solved the problem fails to successfully communicate the solution to the other group members. As noted previously, this rarely happens in the 2x2 treatment. In formulating hypotheses below, we adopt the simplifying assuming that PL = 0 for both the 2x2 and the advice treatment, but in discussing the results of the advice treatment we relate performance by advisees to strong evidence that PL > 0.
The probability of playing strategically as an ML in the 1x1 treatment reduces to p(1x1). If p(2x2) = p(1x1), the probability of an N person team solving the problem reduces to the standard truth wins benchmark: 1 1 (1 1) N px . If teams meet or beat the TW benchmark it follows that p(2x2) ≥ p(1x1) in spite of the factors (free-riding, distraction) mentioned above.
The self-advice treatment does not require subjects to convince a teammate to follow a particular course of action. The probability of solving the problem therefore reduces to p(selfadvice). The self-advice treatment was included in response to suggestions that the simple act of getting players to express their thoughts about the game, which is inherent in the 2x2 treatment, might generate increased reflection and consideration of the strategic possibilities, thereby leading to higher levels of strategic play. We are unaware of any results in the psychology literature, one way or the other, on this point. 11 As such we adopt a null hypothesis of no effect on behavior as a result of self-advice.
Self-Advice H1: Self-advice has no effect on the probability of strategic play compared to a standard 1x1 treatment in which players had no opportunity to comment on their strategies and thoughts: p(self-advice) = p(1x1).
For the advice treatment we distinguish between advisors and advisees. The null hypothesis for advisors is:
Advisor H1: Giving advice has no effect on the probability of strategic play: p(advisor) = p(1x1). 12 The frequency of MLs strategic play as advisors equals the frequency of strategic play in the 1x1 treatment, with or without self-advice.
H1 is based on the idea that since advisors are essentially working on their own (only one head to work with) there is no reason to believe that they will play any more strategically than subjects in either the 1x1 or the self-advice treatments. There are several reasons why this null hypothesis might not hold. 13 First, the psychology literature on accountability suggests that selfcritical and effortful thinking is most likely to be activated when decision makers know that they will be accountable to an audience that is interested in accuracy and is reasonably well informed (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999) , as advisors were. Other factors that might promote higher levels of strategic play include (i) increased monetary incentives as advisors earnings include a modest percentage of their advisees earnings (however, the literature suggests that such a modest increase in incentives will have no major impact on outcomes; see Smith and Walker, 1993, for example) and (ii) to the extent that advisees, on account of having two heads to work with, play more strategically as Ms and are more sensitive to the incentives to enter as Es (increasing the entry rate differential between 4 and 6), advisors receive more informative feedback and face stronger incentives to play strategically than subjects in the 1x1 and self-advice sessions.
We propose two alternative hypotheses for advisees.
11 "Talk aloud" protocols are the closest analogue we are aware of to our self-advice treatment (Ericsson and Simon, 1980) . 12 Alternatively p(advisor) = p(self-advice). To foreshadow the experimental results and to simplify the specifications, in what follows we drop the distinction between p (1x1) and p(self-advice). 13 Greater strategic play by advisors would be consistent with the results of Iyengar and Schotter (2008) , who report that in a decision theoretic context advisors, who did not make choices themselves but were paid on the basis of their advisees' choices, came closer to the optimal choice than subjects deciding alone (either as advisors or advisees).
Advisee H1: Receiving advice has no effect on the probability of strategic play: π(advisee) = π(1x1) = p(1x1).
Advisee H2: An advisee plays strategically if his advisor plays strategically; otherwise he plays strategically with the same probability as a subject in the 1x1 treatment:
Advisee H1 is the null and is based on the idea that advisees are under no obligation to follow the advice they receive and can choose to completely ignore it. If so, they should play no differently than subjects in the 1x1 treatment. Advisee H2 draws on the logic of the TW model.
An advisor who figures out how to play strategically as an ML should recognize the value of this insight and pass it on to their advisee. Advisees who receive advice to play strategically should follow it. In other words, there should be no process loss. An advisee might also figure things out on their own absent any advice to play strategically. Assuming that receiving bad (or at least not useful) advice has no effect on their behavior, the probability of an advisee figuring out strategic play on their own should be the same as in the 1x1 treatment. Taken together, these generate the version of the TW norm given in Advisee H2. Advisee H2 predicts higher levels of strategic play for advisees than in the 1x1 treatment. This does not reflect advisees being any better at figuring out how to play strategically, but instead is strictly a function of them having two heads (their own and their advisor's) to rely upon. In what follows we periodically refer to differences as being statistically significant, with statistical significance established through regressions reported in the Appendix. These regressions are mixed effect models that control for session and individual (or team where appropriate) effects. The regressions include controls for the number of players in a session as well as Es choices. Treatment effects are described as being significant if the relevant parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level or better. We describe a difference as not being statistically significant if the parameter estimate fails to be significant at the 10% level.
Details of how the regressions were constructed, tables of results, and robustness checks are contained in the statistical appendix.
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 1x1 versus the self-advice treatment: Figure 1 compares strategic play in the 1x1 and self-advice treatments for MLs. There is no consistent difference between the two treatments and none of the differences between treatments in any given cycle are statistically significant. Other ways of looking at the data, such as comparing the frequency of specific output choices by MLs or looking at the behavior of MHs and Es, also show no significant differences in behavior between the two treatments. Going forward we pool data from the 1x1 and self-advice treatments, so that references to 1x1 data include the self-advice data.
A natural guess for why self-advice has no effect is that subjects did not write much selfadvice since there was no direct incentive to do so and subjects had only our word that it might be helpful. In fact, use of self-advice was common for inexperienced subjects as 65% entered at least one piece of relevant self-advice (how to choose as either an M or E, or in reference to the population data provided), with an average of 4.8 rounds of play with relevant self-advice being recorded. Content analysis of this self-advice is reported in the Appendix.
Conclusion 1: MLs strategic play in the self-advice sessions is statistically indistinguishable from the level of strategic play in the 1x1 sessions.
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 1x1 versus the 2x2 treatment: Figure 2 compares MLs strategic play in the 1x1 and 2x2
treatments. The truth wins (TW) norm is also shown, including error bars for the 90% confidence interval. 14 MLs' strategic play is significantly higher in the 2x2 treatment than in the 1x1 treatment for all cycles, with teams achieving 100% strategic play in the second and third cycles of experienced subject play. Teams meet or beat the TW norm in each cycle of play, 14 The formula for the truth wins bench mark based on play in the 1x1 treatment is 1 -(1 -p(1x1)) 2 . Because of clustering in the data, simulations are needed to correctly calculate the error bars. The simulated 2x2 data is based on 250,000 simulated 2x2 data sets for each cycle of play, with the same number of teams in each data set as in the experiment. Simulated 2x2 play is based on randomly drawing two subjects (with replacement) from the 1x1 sessions. A simulated team was considered to have played strategically if either of its members played strategically. The error bars then display the 5th and 95 th percentiles of the distribution of percentages of strategic play in a simulated 2x2 data set.
replicating earlier results for the same game (Cooper and Kagel, 2005) . One side note worth reporting here is that there are substantially higher levels of strategic play here for both the 1x1 and the 2x2 treatments than reported earlier, even though we are using the same procedures and the same subject pool (Ohio State undergraduates). The proximate cause for this appears to be substantial increases in SAT/ACT scores and high school class rank of entering freshmen at Ohio State. We explore the relationship between the changing composition of the Ohio State student population and strategic play in another paper (Cooper and Kagel, work in progress).
Conclusion 2: MLs strategic play in the 2x2 sessions is consistently higher than in 1x1 sessions and meets or exceeds the TW norm in each cycle of play.
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 1x1 versus the advice treatment: Getting to the heart of the paper, Figure 3 compares MLs strategic play in the 1x1 and advice treatments. Data for advisors and advisees is reported separately. Advisors' strategic play is initially slightly higher than in the 1x1 treatment, and is significantly higher than in the 1x1 treatment for the second cycle of inexperienced play. This difference is eliminated for experienced subjects, with advisors' strategic play slightly lower than in the 1x1 treatment in the last three cycles of experienced subject play (with this difference statistically significant in the final cycle). Advisees' strategic play parallels that of advisors, being higher than in 1x1 games for both inexperienced cycles (significantly higher in cycle two), and dipping slightly below the 1x1 treatment for the last two cycles of experienced play (where neither difference is statistically significant). Advisees consistently do better than advisors, with this difference statistically significant for the second cycle of inexperienced play as well as the second and third cycles of experienced play.
To test Advisee H2, the version of the TW norm generated by simulating teams made up of one subject from the 1x1 treatment and one advisor from the advice treatment is shown in Figure   3 along with error bars for the 90% confidence interval. To reiterate the basic idea, an advisee should play strategically if either his/her advisor plays strategically (the TW norm assumes that an advisor always passes on advice to play strategically and this advice is always followed) or if an advisee figures it out on his own (which is assumed to happen with the same probability as in the 1x1 sessions). The TW norm is not satisfied here with advisees' strategic play always below it, with the differences statistically significant in all cycles except for the second cycle of inexperienced subject play.
Conclusion 3: Both advisors and advisees have higher levels of strategic play than in the 1x1 treatment through the first cycle of experienced subject play, at which point strategic play tapers off with the 1x1s catching up. Advisees play strategically more often than advisors in all cycles of play, but less than the version of the TW norm embedded in Advisee H2.
[Insert Figure 4 Here] The reason the TW norm fails to predict advisees' strategic play can be seen in Figure 4 . The model assumes that (1) an advisee matched with an advisor who does not play strategically should play strategically no less than subjects in the 1x1 treatment (since they might figure out strategic play on their own), and (2) advisees whose advisors play strategically should always play strategically since their advisor should communicate the idea and the advisees should follow this advice. Part (1) holds for inexperienced subjects, as there is no significant difference in strategic play between the 1x1 treatment and advisees whose advisors are not playing strategically. However, part (2) of the TW model does poorly for inexperienced subjects, as slightly more than a quarter of the advisees whose advisors play strategically fail to do so. While these advisees play strategically significantly more often than subjects in the 1x1 treatment (as well as those advisees whose advisors did not play strategically), they do not come close to the 100% strategic play that Part (2) of the TW requires of advisees. Part (2) of the TW model fails for experienced subjects as well: Advisees whose advisors play strategically play strategically 90% of the time. However, given that only 17% of subjects in the 1x1 treatment fail to play strategically, a 10% failure rate is sufficient for the TW norm not to be satisfied.
Conclusion 4: For both inexperienced and experienced subjects, advisees whose advisors played strategically are significantly more likely to play strategically than advisees whose advisors did not. Nevertheless, the TW norm (Advisee H2) is not satisfied for either inexperienced or experienced advisees.
Process Loss in the Advisor-Advisee Treatment: Recall that the full TW model includes a process loss term, PL, capturing the probability that an individual who figures out strategic play fails to get his teammate(s) to do so. Putting this into the framework of the advice treatment, there are two components of process loss that potentially explain why advisees whose advisors played strategically failed to play strategically themselves: Either the advisor, having played strategically, failed to send the required advice or the advisee failed to follow it. As will be shown both factors are at work here.
To analyze process loss we coded advisors' messages using two simple categories: (1) Was a subject advised to play strategically as an ML (i.e., given explicit advice to choose 5, 6 or 7); and (2) Was a subject given an explanation of why he/she should play strategically as an ML. An explanation of strategic play was broadly defined -it was sufficient, for example, to say that strategic play would make entry less likely without providing any reason this might be true. Two research assistants scored the first time (if ever) a comment in each category was made.
Agreement between the two coders was high -agreeing on the first occurrence in Categories 1 and 2 for 85% and 90% of all observations respectively. Beyond these two categories, we coded how many times each advisor provided relevant advice, where relevant advice is defined as any message on how to play as an M or E. Given the straight forward nature of this task only a single coder was employed.
Before discussing the results of this coding exercise, it is useful to clarify some terminology.
Unless otherwise stated, the unit of observation is a single play by an advisee in the role of an ML. If we say that an advisee has "received advice to play strategically in Period t," this means that the first time they were advised to play strategically as an ML occurred in Period s ≤ t in the same session. In other words, once an advisee has received advice to play strategically, they are assumed to retain that advice for the remainder of the session. This is a reasonable assumption as advisees can access past messages, advice to play strategically is never contradicted in later periods, and the nature of the advice makes it unlikely that advisors will feel the need to repeatedly give the same advice. Extending this terminology, when we state that xx% of advisees in Block XX received advice to play strategically, this means that xx% of the observations of advisees in Block XX received advice to play strategically. Stating that their advisor has played strategically in Period t means that their advisor first played strategically as an ML in Period s ≤ t.
Process Loss Attributable to Advisors:
Most advisees received at least some relevant advice -85.4% (78.4%) of inexperienced (experienced) advisees received at least one piece of relevant advice during an experimental session. Relevant advice was fairly common in general, with inexperienced (experienced) subjects averaging 7.3 (7.4) relevant messages per session.
However, advisees weren't necessarily told to play strategically as an ML (choose 5, 6 or 7) even when their advisors had played strategically themselves: Even though 70% of inexperienced advisors played strategically at least once, in 43% of these cases the advisee never received advice to play strategically. Further, of those advisees who at some point received advice to play strategically, only 58% ever got an explanation for why this was a good course of action.
Process loss remained high for experienced subjects: Although 89% of advisors played strategically at least once, only 58% of advisees ever received explicit advice to play strategically, and only 66% of those receiving such advice ever got an explanation for why they should follow the advice.
Advisors who play strategically at least once as MLs but never send advice to play strategically have no less experience with strategic play than those advisors who do send such advice. Among inexperienced advisors who play strategically at least once, those who never send advice to play strategically are themselves playing strategically an average of 3.6 times per session, scarcely less than the average of 3.8 times for those who do send advice to play strategically. The corresponding numbers for experienced subjects are 6.6 and 7.8 strategic plays per session. As such the failure to send useful advice doesn't seem to reflect a weaker grasp of the benefits of strategic play.
As another way of making this point, consider advisors who first play strategically in the first half of the session (Cycle 1 for inexperienced sessions, Cycles 1 and 2 for experienced sessions).
In inexperienced (experienced) sessions, 41% (38%) of these advisors never advise their partners to play strategically. These advisors have plenty of opportunities to advise strategic play and largely continue to play strategically themselves.
15 Their failure to give useful advice reflects something deeper than a lack of understanding or opportunity.
Two other hypotheses regarding the failure to provide advice have been suggested to us. The first is that by giving advisors a bonus based on their advisee's earnings, we may have inadvertently incentivized advisors to hedge their payoffs, playing strategically while advising otherwise for their advisee. We checked for this explicitly in each of the nine inexperienced subject sessions. We could not find a single instance in which an advisor who had played strategically gave advice to play non-strategically. 16 This lack of hedging makes sense since the incentives for MLs to clearly distinguish themselves from MHs are so strong from very early in the inexperienced sessions that advisors would have to be quite risk averse to hedge in this way.
There are also obvious social conventions which likely inhibit advisors from hedging.
[Insert Figure 5 and 6 here]
The second suggestion is that part of the explanation for the failure to provide advice could be due to differences between men and women in the likelihood of giving advice, and indeed a large discrepancy occurs in all cycles of play (see Figure 5) . Whereas approximately 70% of the men who have played strategically also have given advice to this effect, none of the women who have played strategically provided advice to this effect in the first cycle of inexperienced subject play, with advice transmission asymptoting out at 50% for experienced subject play. A hazard rate model controlling for individual subject differences in the frequency of strategic play confirms the statistical significance of this result -men are significantly faster than women to offer advice to play strategically (see the Appendix). Further investigation of possible gender differences in providing advice show two other phenomena: First, women who have not played strategically are significantly more likely to provide advice to this effect than men who have not played strategically, although the frequency of advice in this case is much lower than for subjects who have played strategically (see Figure 6 ). 17 Second, there are no significant or consistent differences between men and women in the extent to which they provide bad advice (advice to not play strategically as an ML). This rules out the idea that men are simply more prone to proving advice, good or bad, as a proposed explanation for the gender effects reported for advisors. 18 Rather the data seem entirely consistent with the observation that women are less confident of their abilities than men (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) , making them less likely to pass along good advice even after having played strategically themselves, as well as failing to play strategically even after recognizing and passing on advice to act strategically. By extension, it is reasonable to also conclude that failure to advise strategic play after having played strategically reflect low confidence by advisors regardless of gender. After all, while the average man has higher confidence than the average woman, there is no shortage of variation in either population. Process Loss Attributable to Advisees: In about a third of all cases advisees who were given sound advice to play strategically failed to follow that advice. This result parallels findings from the psychology literature on advice taking and decision making where one of the most robust findings is that advisees do not follow advisor's recommendations nearly as much as is optimal.
19 However, the psychology research on this issue typically deals with choosing between multiple choice questions dealing with knowledge issues or estimates of probabilities of events.
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The results reported here extend this egocentric advice discounting result to strategic interactions between agents, as well as to situations where there is a demonstrably correct answer.
Having documented a strong gender effect in the giving of advice, Figure 7 reports gender differences in acting on advice to play strategically. The figure shows that women who have been given advice to play strategically act strategically consistently and substantially more often than women who have not been provided with such advice. In contrast these same differences for men are both smaller in magnitude and less consistent across cycles. While this suggests that women are more responsive to advice than men, part of this difference has to do with the substantially higher levels of strategic play on the part of men who have not been provided with advice which, in conjunction with accounting for individual and session level effects, results in these differences not achieving statistical significance (see Table A .4 and the related discussion in the statistical appendix). While we suspect that women are responding more than men to advice, it will require more and better data than we have to verify this conjecture.
[Insert Figure 7 here] Conclusion 6: The data suggest that women are more responsive to advice than men, but this difference is not statistically significant.
There is one additional surprising outcome with respect to advisees' behavior; namely being given an explanation as to why they should play strategically has essentially no more 19 See Bonaccio and Dalal (2006) for a survey of the relevant psychology literature. 20 For example, in Yaniv (2004; Experiment 1) subjects are asked to give dates for historical events and rewarded for accuracy. They are then asked the same questions a second time, being provided with their own initial answer as well as the answer of another subject. In formulating a new answer, subjects (on average) put a relative weight of .27 on the advice provided relative to their own initial answer, whereas empirically the optimal weight is .44.
impact on inexperienced advisees than simply being told to choose 5, 6, or 7. Table 3 documents this for both inexperienced (top panel) and experienced subjects (bottom panel). Observations are distinguished by whether the advisee had ever been told to play strategically and whether the advisee had ever been given an explanation for playing strategically. 21 While rare, there are a few instances in which advisees' were given an explanation for why they should play strategically without ever being given explicit advice to choose 5, 6 or 7. 22 For each cell we report the frequency of strategic play along with the number of observations in each cell (in parentheses).
[Insert Table 3 here]
For inexperienced subjects there clearly is no differential effect from being provided with an explanation. Although it appears that providing an explanation has a clear marginal positive impact for experienced subjects, the analysis reported in the statistical appendix, which controls
for session level effects, shows that the marginal impact of an explanation is not statistically significant for either inexperienced or experienced advisees. The fact that there is no significant increase in the likelihood of strategic play after being given an explanation suggests that, the primary effect of advice is to make subjects consider strategic play in the first place. 23 Why should advice to play strategically without an explanation have an impact on choices as opposed to the economists' notion that decision makers routinely consider all possibilities? The psychology literature indicates that decision makers routinely do not consider all possibilities, but can and will consider them when prompted to do so (see, for example, Mussweiler et al., 2000 and Lord, et al.,1984) . 24 In our case, in the first several plays of the game, entry is much higher on 2 than on 4, which would tend to reinforce MLs beliefs that their myopic strategy (4) is best. As such the primary role of advice appears to be to get MLs to reconsider these initial beliefs.
The low impact of receiving an explanation makes the occurrence of egocentric advice discounting especially striking in our experiment. Unlike the psychology experiments on advice, there is a demonstrably correct course of action in the limit pricing game. Yet, even with the benefit of an explanation, about a third of inexperienced advisees fail to follow advice to play strategically.
Conclusion 7:
The marginal impact of providing an explanation as to the logic underlying why their advice should be followed has no appreciable impact on the likelihood that the advice will be followed. As such the primary impact of advice appears to be to get subjects to consider alternative strategies that they have come to ignore.
We also coded for whether advisees received bad advice (i.e., advice to play non-strategically as an ML). The statistical appendix shows that bad advice has a modest, but statistically significant, negative effect on the likelihood of strategic play for inexperienced subjects. 25 This reduces the likelihood that advisees will reach the TW norm since the model assumes that incorrect advice is ignored.
More on Gender Effects:
Having documented clear gender differences in the extent to which advisors provide strategic advice, as well as suggestive evidence of gender effects in terms of advisees following the advice they are given, we checked for gender effects on the development of strategic play. As shown in Figure With rare exceptions (advisees late in experienced sessions), strategic play by men is higher than strategic play by women. In the 1x1 data the difference is significant for inexperienced subject play, but not with experienced subjects. Inexperienced female advisees also have significantly lower levels of strategic play than their male counterparts. This difference is no longer statistically significant for experienced subjects, largely because of high levels of strategic play by women who have received advice to play strategically and act on it. For advisors, the difference is only significant for experienced subject play.
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An obvious interpretation of lower levels of strategic play by women is that women are slower to grasp strategic play then men. While this is certainly a possibility, we suspect it isn't the entire story. After all, if the men in our sample are better at logic problems or mathematics than women, we'd expect it to show up on other measures. For more than half of our sample we have access to standardized test scores. 27 The average ACT math score (28.4 for men vs. 27.7
for women) and SAT math score (654 vs. 641) are quite similar and not statistically distinguishable (t = 1.37 and t = 0.97 respectively, with p > .10 in both cases). Combined scores tell the same story, with no significant differences. 28 It seems odd that men in our sample would have a greater ability to grasp strategic play yet have no overall advantage in cognitive ability.
Given that men are both more likely than women to give advice to play strategically when playing strategically and less likely to give advice to play strategically when not playing strategically, it seems equally plausible that lower rates of strategic play by women reflect a lower willingness to trust their insights (that strategic play is a good course of action) as much as a lower ability to recognize the benefits of strategic play.
Conclusion 8:
We consistently find more strategic play by men than women.
Advice versus 2x2 Teams: Figure 9 compares strategic play in the 2x2 games with advisors and advisees. For all cycles, strategic play is greater in the 2x2 treatment than for either advisors or advisees. This difference is significant for advisors in both inexperienced (at the 10% level) and experienced subject play, and for advisees in experienced subject play.
[ Insert Fig 9 here] There are also substantial differences in the amount of relevant information exchanged in the teams' discussions compared to the monologues in the advice treatment. In the inexperienced 2x2 sessions, relevant advice was exchanged in 70% of all periods compared to 22% of all 26 These results parallel findings on gender differences in strategic play reported in Casari, Ham and Kagel (2007) , who find that inexperienced women are more susceptible to the winner's curse than inexperienced men, but these differences disappear with experience. 27 We began gathering test scores mid-way through this project. We have either SAT or ACT scores for 261 of the subjects in this study. 28 Average composite ACT scores are 27.3 for men and 27.4 for women. The t-stat on the difference is 0.14. VI. Summary and Discussion: The purpose of this paper was not so much to study whether advice will affect the development of strategic play, but rather to study the process by which it affects the development of strategic play. Our initial hypotheses drew on the TW model, as modified, to study advice. The standard version of this model assumes that advice will unfailingly transmit insights from advisors to advisees.
The main results of our paper revolve around the failure of this assumption. Even with the advantage of two people's insights, advisees fall below the relevant version of the truth wins norm. Looking at the detailed data reveals (i) that many advisors who play strategically fail to inform their advisees of what it takes to play strategically and (ii) many advisees who are told to play strategically fail to follow this good advice.
The failure of advisors who play strategically to advise their partners to do so cannot be attributed to free riding given the incentive structure of the experiments, and cannot be explained by hedging or the level of experience advisors had with strategic play. Rather, gender differences play a clear role. Male advisors who have played strategically consistently passed on advice to play strategically more often than female advisors. Oddly, male advisors who have not played strategically consistently passed on advice to play strategically less often than female advisors. We believe these findings are related to well established differences in confidence 29 All of the figures in this paragraph come from a limited coding of the 2x2 data reported on here. As noted previously, this was done by a single coder. Given the straight forward nature of the coding, we felt little need for a second coder. 30 Corresponding values for experienced subjects are 90% for teams versus 78% of advisors. 31 This percentage seems low for experienced teams given the near 100% level of strategic play reported. However it was not uncommon for a team to immediately lock into choosing 6, with the requirement that both players agree on a common choice serving in place of explicit discussions of what was, by this time, obvious to most subjects. levels between men and women, so that (i) between gender differences explain a large portion of the failure to pass on advice and (ii) given the inevitable variation in confidence levels within the genders, more than likely between subject differences in confidence levels largely account for the within gender variation in passing on advice.
Gender effects play less of a role in advisees' systematic failures to follow advice to play strategically. Instead, these failures extend psychologists' findings on "egocentric advice discounting" to strategic settings. Failing to follow good advice is especially striking here because playing strategically is a demonstrably correct course of action and receiving an explanation for why strategic play should be used does not improve matters. As the line goes, "… some men [and women] you just can't reach."
Another motivation for the present paper was to better understand why two person teams so consistently outperform individual agents in the development of strategic play for the limit pricing game. Towards this end, we conducted a "self-advice" treatment where subjects play individually but were encouraged to write out their thoughts about the game period by period.
Subjects frequently entered self-advice, but this treatment results in no material increase in the level of strategic play compared to individual subject play without this option. This rules out the simple act of expressing one's thoughts as play progresses as the primary factor behind teams' strong performance relative to the TW norm.
In the advisor-advisee treatment, both advisors and advisees have consistently lower levels of strategic play than in the 2x2 treatment. The implication is that bilateral communication appears to be a necessary condition for meeting and beating the truth wins norm, in spite of the fact that teams are susceptible to free riding and/or idle chatter that distracts from dealing with the problem at hand. In this respect it is notable that relevant comments (i.e. comments about how to play the game) are far more frequent in the 2x2 treatment than in the advice treatment.
Because teams make a single joint decision, we cannot observe cases in the 2x2 treatment where a subject recognizes strategic play but doesn't propose it due to a lack of confidence.
However, the frequent occurrence of this event in the advice treatment suggests it as an additional, previously unrecognized, source of inefficiency in team play. It makes the generally strong performance of freely interacting two person teams in our strategic environment even more surprising and suggests that the strong performance of teams will be less dramatic for larger teams, assuming that individuals who lack confidence will be even less likely to speak up in a larger group.
The differences between men and women advisors in passing on strategic advice prompted us to look for gender differences in the development of strategic play over time in all treatments.
We find consistently higher levels of strategic play for men. While this could reflect inherent differences in ability, we conjecture that differences in confidence may be an equally if not more important factor behind this outcome. Just as many women learn to play strategically but fail to advise their partner to do so, we suspect that women are disproportionately likely to figure out strategic play but lack the confidence to implement their insight.
The relative success of freely interacting teams compared to advisees bears some important similarities to the difference between successful and unsuccessful consulting relationships in field settings: Client organizations perceive effective consulting as a two-way interaction with knowledge outflow from client to consultant influencing the quantity and quality of knowledge inflow from the consultant to the client organization (Todorova, 2004 , Newell, 2005 . In this respect teams, with their two way interaction, strongly outperform "clients" in the advice treatment even though there are two heads to work with in both cases. This may also have implications for successful discussions between different divisions within a hierarchal organization, particularly to the extent that lower ranked members might be constrained in their discussions and/or interactions with higher ranked members.
One particularly surprising feature of our data is that the positive impact of advice to play strategically is essentially independent of whether or not a sound explanation accompanies the advice to take a new, and improved, course of action. This suggests that the main impact of advice is to simply get advisees to consider some new options. This contradicts economists' usual assumption that agents carefully consider all the options at their disposal prior to making their choices. 
